SE
T
CRET
PARAPHRASE.
5
220
Fan:- G.Ò.c. Shanghai Defence Force.
10:- The War Office.
D.5178 cipher 27/4.
Desp. 1515 27/4/27 Reca. 1205 27/4/27
I was shown by Tyrwhitt yesterday copy of Admiralty telegram 756 asking his reasons for favouring re-occupation of Hankow and I agree with him concession should be taken back; this would mean re-occupation with sufficient force to hold it until such time as a definite and lasting agreement with a responsible Chinese Government is reached. Admittedly it is a detachment but Japanese concession has successfully been held by them, and I consider three battalions would be ample and could be maintained there if necessary throughout winter. A temporary re-occupation by force based on ships might only lead to incidents and renewed outbreak of hooliganism and anti-foreign feeling as soon as the large ships and troops were withdrawn in autumn. Markedly improved behaviour of Chinese at Hankow since arrival of "Vindictive" and "Carlisle" shows that they are quick to react to a show of force. Hankow is political strategic centre of Bolshevism and although outside my province I believe re-occupation of our concession could be justified on ground that in no single particular have Chinese kept Chen-Omalley agreement.. To hold it in suspense until the establishment of a
Government which can carry out terms in promised spirit would be giving moderate elements, which are showing themselves anxious to eliminate Russian influence, direct moral support.
Should desire of Chiang Kai Shek to throw over Communism prove later to be genuine, our re-occupation of Hankow might bring about a definite split in Kuomintung party and possibly lead later to an alliance between him and the other moderate leaders, but this naturally is only a vague forecast. The use of Hankow as a sanction would be direct hit at people primarily responsible for outrages at Nanking and I feel that any other sanction would lose all direct connection between cause and effect through the unavoidable but regrettable delay which has elapsed since this deed. I fancy Chiang Kai Shek is lying low at Nanking and until he sees tenor of next note will not make any definite declaration of policy. I feel unless strong action to punish those responsible for Nanking outrages is taken soon Chinese will think we are afraid to act in spite of our large naval and military force here the effect of which to our prestige in the east would be disastrous..
9:4:1Telegrams) copies to:- ARMY COUNCIL, D.M.O. & 1. D.D.M.O. & I. M.0.1.la.Id. M.I.1.2.2c., D.S.D., D.M.T., Foreign Affairs, Sir William Tyrrell, Sir Maurice Hankey, F.0.(Mr.Ashton
Prime Minister, S. ọf S
ofs. for Gwatkin), S. of S. for Colonies, C.0.(Mr Clauson) Lord Beatty, First Lord of Admiralty, Ad.(D..I., Ad. (D.O.D.
C.0.(Sir J.E.Shuckburgh), Ad.(D.of P., S. of S. for Air, C.A.S.(Air Linistry), D.C.A.S.(Air Mini stry) D.D.O.I.(Air Ministry), Air Ministry (R.Tels.)
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